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Abstract: Behaviour of an individual is seen as the result of a series of decisions taken on the basis 
of his taken-for-granted knowledge about the universe – that knowledge is shared by specific 
others. That is the social reality we are trying to explain. The individual is able to account for his 
behaviour and state of his knowledge in contingent, episodic and anecdotal ways because of its 
“taken-for-grantedness”. However, a detailed study permits us to present both his actions and 
his knowledge in a systematic way, together with the principles by which he organizes them. The 
fact of action being taken as result of a series of decisions means that the individual is not just 
a “norm-fulfilling unit”, he is, within limits given by his knowledge, manipulating his social world.
Keywords: anthropologist’s observation and interpretation of social reality, people’s notions 
of functioning of their society
I.
There is a story about two psychoanalysts who had their offices on the same street. 
Every morning they passed each other without greeting. One morning, however, one of 
them said “good morning”. The other did not answer, went on, and after a few steps turned 
around. “Now”, he mused, looking after the first, “I wonder what he really meant by that?”.
The point of this story could almost be taken as a parole de guerre of social anthro-
pology. In a sense, the real meaning of what man, people, societies say, do, or otherwise 
express, is what most anthropology is about. The same is valid for all other social sciences 
too, but since this is basically a discussion among anthropologists, I prefer to speak only 
about this subject. To put it in other words, anthropology tries to find a real, i.e. true (not 
only satisfactory) explanations of why people do the things they do and say the things 
they say. Put simply like that, it seems a pretty straightforward, if broad and formidable, 
task. We can say naively – well, why not ask them? Naively, because it is precisely at this 
point that the difference between “real” and satisfactory understanding, or explanation, of 
human behaviour enters, and starts to play havoc with that task. The main problems which 
are involved here derive from two sets of assumptions on which the anthropological theory 
of explanation is based and which are taken, by and large, as axioms. The first set refers to 
the societies or people studied by anthropologists:
1. The people observed may have satisfactory (to them) explanations, but these are 
rarely, if ever, true explanations, since the people have no adequate knowledge of the causes 
and consequences of their behaviour.
2. The explanations the people have are, in fact, devices “used to summon behaviour 
as much as to explain it” [Wilson 1970: xi]. That is, their explanations are, in fact, 
*  Essay was first published in 1976 by The Department of Social Anthropology, of The Queen’s University of 
Belfast, in. The Queen’s University Papers in Social Anthropology, Volume 1, edited by Ladislav Holy.10
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legitimizations, rationalizations or justifications of the phenomena they purport to explain. 
Therefore, the people have no means of assessing the truth of an explanation, other than 
the observable or believed-in effectiveness of a given behaviour.
3. The explanations the people have are particularistic and contingent, not generalizing, 
therefore, they cannot have any standards of critical discussion and refutation by contra-
dictory evidence. In fact, they cannot even have the concept of contradictory evidence.
The second set refers to the anthropologists and can be formulated as an almost word 
for word reversal of the first set:
1. The anthropologists’ knowledge is adequate, or can be made adequate, for true expla-
nations, since it discerns through observation and induction, causes and consequences of 
particular events.
2. Their explanations are intended to account for phenomena – not to rationalize or 
justify their occurrence, therefore, they can be assessed as true or false on the basis of the 
comprehensibility of that account, regardless of what the people observed take as right or 
wrong.
3. Their explanations are, or can be, generalized and independent of the phenomena 
explained, therefore, they are able to discover contradictory evidence, assess its importance 
and either refute the explanation or reidentify the phenomena previously taken as con-
tradictory evidence. As Jarvie deftly puts it: “(…) our standards of critical discussion are 
better than no standards of critical discussion, and the latter is the situation of the savage” 
[Jarvie 1970: 61].
In anthropological writings, these twin sets of assumptions, or any part of them, are 
seldom made explicit and even more seldom, if ever, taken as a subject for discussion. They 
are just tacitly taken for granted (the exceptions being, to a certain degree, cognitive anthro-
pology and discussions about emic- and etic-oriented studies in America), and discussion 
of them is defined as philosophical and therefore not pertaining to the range of things 
anthropologists should be discussing. As a matter of fact, it is in the philosophy of science 
that we can find, especially in recent years, anthropological data and arguments used in 
discussions of the standards of rationality, of the assessment of the adequacy of knowledge, 
of satisfactory, true and false explanations, etc. I am entering this particular field with some 
hesitation, and only after claiming the right to be naive as a practitioner of one discipline 
when treating subjects generally recognized as belonging to another [cf. Gluckman 1964: 
16 ff.]. However, since we are more or less uncritically working with assumptions that are 
freely discussed in philosophical writings, and with our data too, I believe we should have 
our say about them as well.
The very nature of the assumptions formulated above, and the fact that they form 
a taken-for-granted background of our normal work, make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to discuss them only in the rather abbreviated form in which they are expressed here. To 
appreciate their importance and their consequences for anthropological interpretation, 
a somewhat broader background discussion is needed. Basically, these assumptions derive 
from what is taken to be the existential status of social reality (i.e. from the ontology of 
social sciences) and from what is taken to be its epistemological status, or, more specifi-
cally, what are postulated as legitimate processes of making meaningful generalized state-
ments about it. My position is that we are making an unwarranted division of the universe 
under consideration into two separate spheres: social reality itself, and procedures for 11
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making generalized statements about it, as if they were two different universes. In other 
words, we are ascribing differential status to the observed people’s activities, beliefs and 
knowledge, and to the anthropologists’ activities, beliefs and knowledge. The first, which is 
to be observed and explained, is conceived of as existing somewhere outside of the anthro-
pologists’ sphere, as having an independent existence; simply as being “social reality”. (This 
concept, though not commonly used, has appeared often enough in anthropological writ-
ings to justify its use here.) The latter, which is taken to be different, must then be either 
non-social reality, or social non-reality, or perhaps non-social non-reality. This may sound 
like a rather bad pun, but intend to argue that anthropologists tacitly assume the position 
that it is, indeed, non-social reality.
As a case in point, let us consider briefly the concept of culture in its classical Tylo-
rian sense, which includes all things social. Most anthropologists would agree that it is 
man-made, that culture is the product of man’s activities. If such is the case, then clearly 
people’s accounts of how it came into being, or how it goes on, are real accounts, accounts 
of what “really happened or happens”. People’s explanations are basically statements about 
the relationship between their knowledge and their activity, statements about the actual 
emergence of cultural phenomena or events. Yet, these accounts or explanations are seen 
by the anthropologists as being „satisfactory for them, but “false for us”. Like the psychoan-
alysts mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the anthropologists are looking for the real 
explanation, for the real meaning of observed or inferred phenomena. Thus, the agreement 
about culture being man made becomes an empty concession, since the real meaning, or 
true contents, and in the last instance the very existence of the culture, is conceived of as 
being independent of those who are supposed to have made it. In common practice, this 
real explanation is assumed to have been achieved when a given phenomenon or event is 
somehow related to some larger plan or charter. Typical examples of such plans or charters 
are structure, evolutionary stage, or ecosystem; the choice between these and other similar 
charters depends on what particular set of assumptions about the nature of social reality 
the anthropologist holds to be true. The general laws determining the ordered arrangement 
of generalized units of such a charter, or the general principles which cause them to be so 
arranged, do not apply only to social phenomena, but to the universe at large, or at least 
form a specific subset of such principles. For instance, organic, mechanical, and similar 
analogies are often used in anthropological explanations, purportedly to illustrate some 
point, but in fact to strengthen it. Thus, social reality is seen as explained, or even as mean-
ingfully existing, owing to non-social or not-only-social causes. It is not, in any significant 
sense, “made” by the people, in spite of the generally accepted declaration to the contrary. 
People act only as agents of non·social, or not-only-social forces. (They can be made aware 
of them, but this does not make them more social.) The existential status of social reality 
is assumed to be that of the “real thing” existing “out there” [cf. Filmer et al., 1972: 18 tf].
The individual’s activities, which have meaning or purpose for him and derive from 
his knowledge, are not really those which the anthropologist relates to his plan or char-
ter. These activities, or other events, are seen by the anthropologist as derived from the 
causal principles of the charter which naturally changes their meaning and puts them on 
a different level. Nothing recognizable to an individual or dependent on him, is left, save 
possibly a series of acts seen as expenditures of energy, which is not what we study. For 
all practical purposes, culture becomes simply an attribute of a class of phenomena called 12
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human groups, more or less in the same way as dimensions are attributes of a class called 
physical objects. Thus, the definition of the universe studied by anthropologists as social 
reality is not only an empty term, but actually a misleading one, since it names boundaries, 
or, more exactly, a property which the same anthropologists are implicitly denying by their 
activities.
This, however, is only the first half of the argument: I have tried to show that anthro-
pologists study culture, or social reality, as a consequence of non-social, or not-only-social 
forces or organizing principles, thus ascribing to it the existential status of non-social real-
ity. The second half of the argument involves the nature of those legitimate processes of 
making meaningful, generalized statement about social reality which I mentioned earlier, 
i.e. its epistemological status. I would like to return here to the assumption that popular 
explanations are false or inadequate, because they are summonses for behaviour as much 
as, or even more than, they are explanations for it. For the anthropologist, they are neither 
nearer to, not further from, true explanations. They are contingent, subject to manipula-
tion for reasons of effectiveness, and so on. In short, they are subject to the demands of 
the social world and they are legitimate or true if they are accepted by it. The individual 
is a creative agent in this context: he formulates the explanations according to his own 
knowledge and as a function of his and others’ behaviour. Therefore, his explanations 
belong, at best, to the social reality itself and their formulation is a social action.
Anthropologists’ explanations, by contrast, do not summon any behaviour, except pos-
sibly approval, elaboration or refutation by other anthropologists. They are presented as 
final explanations, and their relative distance from truth is the only criterion of their valid-
ity. They are subject to the demands of eliciting meaningful accounts of the social world, 
though, as we have seen, in terms of non social or not-only-social principles.
The anthropologist appears as acogniting and eliciting agent. He formulates his expla-
nations as a result of the formalized processing of data, and both the processing of the 
data and the resulting explanations are seen as independent of the data processed, that 
is, of the social world. No legitimate contingent relations to what is going on around the 
anthropologist are recognized: the fact that the anthropologist belongs to the same cate-
gory as those who inhabit the social world is supposed to be irrelevant to his activities qua 
anthropologist.1 This definition of what anthropologists do, or are supposed to do, would 
probably be accepted by most of them. It can be best illustrated with Harris’s definition of 
etic statements:
Etic statements depend upon phenomenal distinctions judged appropriate by the community 
of scientific observers. Etic statements cannot be falsified if they do not conform to the actor’s 
notion of what is significant, real, meaningful or appropriate. Etic statements are verified when 
independent observers using similar operations agree that a given event has occurred. An ethno-
graphy carried out according to etic principles is thus a corpus of predictions about the behaviour 
of classes of people. Predictive failures in that corpus require the reformulation of probabilities or 
the description as a whole. [Jarvie 1970: 61]
1  I am referring here to the anthropologist as an agent eliciting explanations and laws, not to his activities, for 
example, a radical in racial disputes, or an advocate for a particular group of people in general. These activities. 
though performed frequently by him, relate to his main activities at best marginally, and at worst not at all.13
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Though Harris’s definition is slightly couched in terms that sound contingent or option-
al, such as “phenomenal distinctions judged appropriate by the community of scientific 
observers”, they are not meant to be so. Traced back far enough, the criteria of appropri-
ateness will always be truth criteria derived from the anthropologist (or a community of 
scientific observers) assuming as true a set of non-social or not-only-social organizing 
principles of the universe at large.
Thus, people’s explanations or meaningful statements about phenomena are seen by 
anthropologists as a part of social reality, as social activities. On the other hand, anthropol-
ogists consider their own explanations and accounts as statements about social reality from 
the outside, as activities not determined by pressures and rules existing in the social world 
and, therefore, in the last instance, as non-social activities. They are externally social in the 
sense that they are carried out by human beings (anthropologists), but they are supposedly 
determined and organized by principles independent of any social reality.
I would argue that this is a part of anthropological and, in general, scientific mythol-
ogy and that the distinction between people’s explanatory and accounting activities and 
anthropologist’s explanatory and accounting activities as they stand, is unwarranted and 
illegitimate. This can be demonstrated, I believe, by showing that anthropologist’s activ-
ities and explanations exhibit, upon closer examination the same characteristics that are 
considered by them as fallacious in people’s explanations. This will be simile to, though not 
identical with, the point Kuhn is making about the development of science:
(…) these same historians confront growing difficulties in distinguishing the “scientific” com-
ponent of past observation and belief from what their predecessors had readily labelled ‘error’ and 
“superstition”. The more carefully they study, say Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry, or 
caloric thermodynamics, the more certain they feel that those once current views of nature were, 
as a whole, neither less scientific nor more the product of human idiosyncrasy than those current 
today. If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can be produced by the same 
sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge. If, 
on the other hand, they are to be called science, then science has included bodies of belief quite 
incompatible with the ones we hold today. [Kuhn 1971: 2]
What Kuhn proposes is, basically, that “scientific by their standards” and “scientific by 
our standards” belong to the same sphere. The “scientificity” of statements or validity of 
laws is measured according to the distance from truth, but the truth criteria themselves 
are contingent and are agreed upon by people who inhabit the social world. If accepted, 
this proposition would make it rather difficult to accuse people’s explanations of falsity and 
contingency and to see anthropologists’ explanations as having a differential dimension 
of truth and having, ideally, no contingent relations with the contemporary social world. 
There is, in fact, ample evidence that anthropologists are aware that their theories, or to 
be more exact, other anthropologists’ theories, can be considered as resulting from the 
demands of the social world they inhabit, and not from the demands of simply eliciting 
the most meaningful accounts of the reality. When the evolutionists, who at the time rep-
resented the most diffused and most consistent theoretical school, were being criticized, 
the critique was based on two main points. The first was that the data, often collected by 
evolutionists themselves, did not in fact necessarily prove the existence of an ongoing evo-
lution of human societies nor the existence of immutable laws of cultural evolution. The 14
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second was that evolutionism itself was not formulated as a result of the quest for truth, but 
as legitimization or justification for the superordinate position of a handful of developed 
societies. In other words, the principles on whose basis evolutionary explanations were 
formulated, were considered by later critics as having been adopted by the evolutionists 
because of the particular organization of their social world, and not because of the socially 
independent quest for truth.
A similar argument applies also to structuralism or functional structuralism which 
replaced evolutionism as a leading theoretical school. Structuralism also claimed that its 
basic assumptions about the nature of social reality, and the basic principles on which 
it bases its explanations (structural and/or functional interdependence of phenomena, 
equilibrium, homeostasis) are socially independent and ultimately lead to the accounts 
of a social universe which is not “meaningful to us”, but true. However, there have 
appeared, over the last few decades, a host of new theoretical approaches that criticize 
the assumptions and principles of structuralism as not being derived from the objective 
demands to find true explanations, but, again, as being contingent to a particular orga-
nization of the social world. Most of the structuralists, who belonged to a large colonial 
empire, took this empire as a natural and necessary formation and therefore dedicated 
their attention to the forces which hold it, or any large social group, together. And in 
their turn, the representatives of some more radical theoretical approaches have been 
criticized for holding their methodological principles because of their commitment to 
a specific project of the future, that is, again because of the conditions of their own 
social world.
I am not interested here in the merits of these critiques, nor in the defence of one the-
ory against another. I am using this very brief and simplified argument only to show that 
anthropologists themselves often accuse each other, not of being less true, but of holding 
theories because of the demands of social reality, that is, contingent ones. Let us consider 
evolutionism, structuralism, and a host of new approaches, as paradigms in the sense of 
Kuhn’s definition, i.e. as “universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time 
provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners” [Kuhn 1971: viii]. 
The usual idea was that one paradigm can be invalidated by a cumulative process of scien-
tific achievement. Kuhn calls this “the concept of development-by-accumulation” [Ibid.: 2] 
and criticizes it on the grounds that a simple accumulation of data is not enough to change 
a paradigma. This requires profound changes in how the world is seen and what scien-
tific work in such a world is conceived to be [Ibid.: 4 and passim]. In the example I have 
mentioned above, the practitioners of each paradigm were seeing themselves as pursuing 
the true knowledge and explaining social reality in the only possible meaningful way. In 
all cases, they were accused by their opponents not only of not producing satisfactory 
evidence, which could be ascribed to insufficient techniques, imprecise interpretations, 
and so on, but of formulating the whole paradigm because it was in agreement with how 
social reality was organized in their time, and not because of its real explanatory value. 
That is, their paradigm was not really derived from the demands of true explanations and 
true accounting, but from the demands of their own social world, which means that it is 
therefore a satisfactory and contingent paradigm for them, but not true for us, regardless 
of whether or not they are aware of it. Harris’s definition of emic statements is, I believe, 
appropriate here:15
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Emic statements refer to logico-empirical systems whose phenomenal distinctions or “things” 
are built up out of contrasts and discriminations significant, meaningful, real, accurate, or in some 
other fashion regarded as appropriate by the actors themselves. [Harris 1968: 571]
Of course, the term “emic” is used to describe people’s cognitive systems and explana-
tions. However, we have seen that the cognitive systems within which anthropologists work, 
and therefore the explanations of social reality they offer, must be taken, on anthropologists’ 
own evidence, as being no less contingent, no less subject to the demands of social reality, 
and no less emic than people’s accounts of social reality. Therefore, they cannot be measured 
as being nearer to, or further from, the truth than people’s explanations, but as being more 
or less satisfactory in offering knowledge “meaningful to us”. What anthropologists do, is no 
less a part of the social world, and no less a social activity, than what people do.
My opening argument can be summed up briefly in the following way: anthropolo-
gists hold, more or less explicitly, a set of ontological assumptions about the nature of the 
universe they study. It is conceived of as a social reality, produced and maintained by the 
people they study. Anything people do or say, including their explanations and accounts 
of the social world, is a part of this social reality. At the same time, anthropologists hold 
a set of epistemological assumptions about the nature and legitimacy of their own activities 
and explanations, making thus a qualitative difference between these and social reality. 
Their activities are defined as the search for true explanations of social reality. They see 
their activities as the eliciting of causal principles or laws which order the universe; these 
principles are therefore subject not to the effectiveness of the social world, but to the crite-
ria and demands of this eliciting. To put it crudely, anthropologists see themselves not as 
members of the social world but as agents of truth.
I am trying to show that both these sets of assumptions are being held illegitimate-
ly. This can be demonstrated by the actual practice of anthropologists. As concerns the 
first set of assumptions, the universe of study is called social reality, but the phenomena 
and events composing it are treated as having the same characteristics and as subject to 
the same organizing principles as the universe at large. Therefore, the specification of the 
object of study as social reality is redundant and, in fact, misleading or, as I have said above, 
illegitimate. As concerns the second set of assumptions, anthropologists claim non-social 
status for their activities and explanations, separating them from the universe of study. 
However, they mutually refute these claims by showing that other anthropologists’ expla-
nations are not less true, but more socially determined, for all practical purposes in the 
same way as people’s explanations are socially determined. Since there is no main anthro-
pological theory which was not so criticized, it is impossible to uphold the qualitative 
difference between people’s knowledge and explanations and anthropologists’ knowledge 
and explanations, and the qualitative difference claimed by anthropologists again becomes 
redundant and therefore illegitimate.
II.
In the second section of this paper, I would like to discuss some methodological or, 
more exactly, interpretative consequences which necessarily follow when the above-men-
tioned sets of assumptions are put into operation. In our work, we are basically concerned 
with giving meaningful accounts of the things people do and say. Mostly, anthropologists 16
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have very clear ideas about how to do it and what constitutes meaningful accounts. Let us 
take as an example the position formulated succinctly by Harris when discussing the emic-
etic approaches. He uses, as an illustrative example, the lineage fission among the Bathonga 
of Mozambique:
Now it is a regular etic feature of Bathonga life that the local lineage fissions when population 
exceeds 100 or 200 people, that the break involves the establishment of new households with 
a junior son and his mother at the core, and that the break is accompanied by all sorts of hostile 
expressions, including witchcraft accusations. To regard the fission event as a result of the inter-
section of all of the codes that might conceivably have influenced the behaviour of the agnates (…) 
is a hopeless task. The fission of a Bathonga homestead is a cultural event and is not conceivable 
in any operational sense as a manifestation of a code. On the contrary, it is simply and clearly and 
operationally conceivable as an etic phenomenon in which the rate of fission expresses (…) the 
density and spacing of the animal and human population (…) [Harris 1968: 610–612]
Leaving aside ancillary problems, such as whether there can be etic phenomena or 
only etic or other statements about phenomena, or why a cultural event is necessarily not 
a manifestation of a code, I see two main questions arising from this quotation. The first is, 
why is Bathonga lineage fission an etic event? And the second, in what sense is the event 
that Harris studies in fact Bathonga lineage fission?
With regard to the first question, what happens is that a junior son and his followers 
leave the local lineage and establish themselves elsewhere. The son has his reasons for 
doing so. One of these can be that he feels in danger of being hurt or killed by witchcraft; 
another is that he expects to gain success and prestige, access to which is far more difficult 
for him in his original lineage; the third is, possibly, that he feels obliged to follow the rule, 
the fourth, for all I know, could be that it seems to him there are too many people around. 
It would be facetious to take Harris at face value and suppose that he has chosen the etic 
approach only because there are so many factors involved that it would be a “hopeless 
task” to try to sort them out. On the other hand, I cannot see why the fission of a lineage 
cannot be conceivable in any operational sense as a result of a series of decisions; after all, 
every Bathonga junior son conceives it thus and lives in a world where everybody else 
does. Thus, it would be more correct to suppose that Harris takes Bathonga lineage fission 
as an etic event because he believes that in this way he can say something more important 
about it – at least a thousand times more important, I should add, judging by his critique 
of Frake’s attempt to derive the Subanum settlement pattern from emic rules: “Frake does 
not describe the actual pattern of dispersal of household sites. One description of such 
a pattern showing long-term stability or change in relationship to population size and 
production factors would be worth a thousand emic rules” [Harris 1968: 603].
Now, the lineage fission is presented to us not as a simple statistical concurrence of 
the type: “Whenever a Bathonga lineage reaches the size of 100–200 members, it splits 
up.” If that were the case, we would be faced with a statement of the type: “Wherever the 
mailboxes are blue, the post functions more efficiently than wherever they are red.” I am 
sure a number of appropriate cases could be found. For Harris, there is a causal relation 
involved: lineage fission is caused by the “density and spacing of the animal and human 
population under the techno-environmental conditions of Southern Mozambique”. Dif-
fering from Harris, I believe that, unless we want to hold the position that identical envi-
ronments produce by themselves identical technologies (which would amount to a rather 17
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crude ecological determinism), given the environmental conditions, it is basically tech-
nology that determines the critical point of permissible density and spacing of the popu-
lation. Technology, built up of knowledge, skills, methods, recipes, tools, equipment, etc., 
is an emic system par excellence, because it certainly consists of phenomena which are 
“significant, meaningful, real, accurate, or in some other fashion regarded as appropriate 
by the actors themselves” [Harris 1968: 571]; otherwise they would not have them and 
use them. Given this technology, when a group of Bathonga grows to certain proportions 
(according to Harris, 100–200 members) certain things start to occur which did not occur 
before: a drop in consumption, a feeling of the younger son of being barred from success, 
witchcraft accusations, etc. These problems, or more exactly the situation resulting from 
them, need to be solved. From our viewpoint, there are several alternative ways of solving 
them, such as a change in the technology or reorganization of the group. However, these 
alternatives do not exist in the Bathonga world: the only option they have is to split the 
group and thus get rid of the problematic situation. The move of one part of the original 
group to a new homestead is in this sense a fully emic event. Its only claim to eticity would 
then possibly hinge on the question of whether or not the members of the group are 
themselves aware that their growing numbers have something to do with it. That I do not 
know, but I would strongly suggest that in the absence of positive proofs that they are not 
aware, it could be very misleading just to assume it. If they are aware of this, then there is 
nothing at all about the lineage fission which is mysterious, meaningless or unaccounted 
for by the Bathonga themselves. And in such a case, the term “etic cultural event” does 
not amount to more than a shorthand term for a complex of emic cultural events, to be 
used only because to disentangle that complex would be a “hopeless task”. Therefore, one 
significant dimension is chosen; this is ascribed etic status and used as explanans. Harris 
presumably considers the quantified basis of his conclusion and its predictive value as 
a proof that his choice of significance is correct. As to quantification, why could it not be 
said that the lineage splits whenever witchcraft accusations start to exhibit a determined 
frequency or intensity, or, for that matter, when the damage caused by witches amounts 
to so much? Should this statement be considered etic, too? As to the matter of predictive 
value, does Harris really mean that there could not be a lineage which splits with 99 
members or stays united with 201 members? Almost certainly not. I do not doubt that 
he would have a valid explanation for any off limit case, but the point is that such an 
explanation would certainly be a contingent one. So, the prediction should not be read 
as: “given the techno-environmental conditions, it is impossible for a Bathonga lineage 
to split with 99 members, and to stay with 201 members.” It should read as: “there are no 
known cases of Bathonga lineages splitting with less than 100 members and not splitting 
with more than 200 members.” Again, the question arises, what makes it different from 
the prediction that the lineage will split with such-and-such a frequency of witchcraft 
accusations or such-and-such a frequency and intensity of witchcraft activities? It seems 
to me that the difference between both predictions, and therefore the eticity of Harris’s 
statement, depends simply on his belief that population density is the “real” reason, while 
witchcraft is not. Why? Because population density makes sense to him, while witchcraft 
does not. That would make it Harris’s emic statement, and not an etic one. Perhaps he calls 
it etic because population density makes sense to some other anthropologists. But, then, 
witchcraft makes sense to all Bathonga.18
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Now as to the second question, namely, in what way is the event that Harris studies 
Bathonga lineage fission? The fission is described as a necessary result of the growth of 
a lineage size to 100–200 members, under given techno-environmental conditions. When 
that occurs, a certain number of members move out and settle elsewhere. Even supposing 
that this is an etic event, what is cultural about it? When described like that, it belongs to 
the same category of events as the fact that when a herd of wildebeests consumes all the 
grass on one pasture, it moves to another one. The only difference, and therefore the only 
reason for calling it a cultural event, is that Bathonga fission occurs in a human group. 
Harris conceives of culture exactly in the sense I mentioned earlier: simply as an attribute 
of a class of phenomena called human groups. My point is that Bathonga lineage fission 
is not, and therefore cannot meaningfully be accounted for as, a simple transference of 
a certain number of persons from one place to another. If this were so, and if it were caused 
by pressure or population density only, it would not matter who actually left. Provided 
a certain number of people moved, the situation would be solved. However, Bathonga 
lineage fission is a structured event; it is the departure of a junior son with his mother and 
followers, every one of them being recruited according to certain emic principles. All of 
them depart because of their specific emic reasons. The departure of any other part of the 
group would not be a lineage fission. It is, therefore, a social event (or, to maintain the ter-
minology, a cultural event) which cannot meaningfully be described in etic terms. We can 
do it, as Harris does, but only at the cost of depriving it of any social or cultural content and 
defining it as a “natural” event, that is, changing it into something that has no existential 
status whatsoever in the social world we are studying. The reasons Bathonga have for what 
they are doing are an indivisible part of the reality we are studying. To replace them with 
the reasons we take to be true means to deny the existence of a part of that reality. Since 
that reality is indivisible, it means, in practical terms, to deny its whole existence and to 
replace it with a reality we have shaped according to our reasons and purposes. It can be 
done (we should know – it was, and is, done often enough), but it should not be presented 
as the study of the natives’ reality.
Another example will, I hope, make still clearer what I have in mind. The Mapuche 
in Southern Chile have female shamans, called machi, who officiate in cases of sickness. 
A machi performs for the sick person a healing ceremony which is more or less standard 
in the sense of having been described many times for many tribes. This consists of invok-
ing her familiar spirits and with their help chasing away the spirit of sickness, by means 
of ringing magic bells, shooting rifles around the outside of the house, smoking over the 
patient, etc. Finally, she gives the sick person herbs for making tea. It is a system which 
practically offers itself for study as two separate systems of activities: one pertaining to the 
sphere of “ritual”, which is derived from beliefs about the causes of sickness; and the other, 
pertaining to the sphere of “real curing”, which derives from the machi’s knowledge of 
the actual healing effects of the herbs. It was, is, and probably will be, studied many times 
over in exactly these terms. What I am suggesting is that Mapuche know it as a single and 
indivisible system of activities and that it has no other source, or expression of existence, 
than in the knowledge and actions of the Mapuche. When the observer applies his own 
knowledge and divides it in two, he is creating a thing which did not exist, and does not 
exist, in the reality he pretends to study. Once again, in practical terms it means that the 
object of his study has no empirical referent; it does not exist.19
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Holy’s paper about Cewa sorcery is dealing with a very similar problem. One of the 
sociological ways of interpreting sorcery is to treat it as a sort of safety valve, or “strain-
gauge”, for social tensions. However, since we know there is no such thing as sorcery, we 
cannot really take into account the relations between a sorcerer and a supposed victim, 
because these are strictly imaginary: the tensions which are being vented, or resolved, 
must be between “real” persons who, in this case, can only be accusers and accused. Unfor-
tunately, such an approach leads in the last instance, as Holy shows in his analysis, to 
a virtual denial of existence of an important part of the social reality we are supposed to 
be studying. We are using our knowledge and our methodology not to account for the 
existing phenomena, but to decide which phenomena exist. By doing this, we are making 
an unwarranted and unjustified comment on reality.
I would like to return once more to what I said at the beginning of this section, namely 
that we are basically concerned with giving meaningful accounts of the things people 
do and say – in other words, with explaining their social reality. The reasons why they 
do and say these things, that is, the knowledge from which their sayings and doings 
derive, are as much a part of that reality as anything else. As I have argued above, we can-
not simply supply their doings and sayings with reasons of our own: we have to take them 
as an indivisible part of our object of study. We begin our study by observing activities, 
but to make only descriptive statements about activities is considered “ethnography” in 
a pejorative sense: only when we start looking for reasons for activity does the account 
or explanation truly begin. Looking for reasons necessarily involves assumptions about 
knowledge: to have a reason means to know that the activity will somehow work towards 
cancelling this reason. Consider, on the one hand, the statements: “I have a reason for 
wanting a metal axe: it is more effective than a stone one”, or: “I have a reason for moving 
out of my lineage: my relatives try to bewitch me”; and on the other hand the statements: 
“There is a reason why South Sea peoples did not develop metallurgy: there are no metal 
ores there”, or: “There is a reason for lineage fission: it maintains the optimum popula-
tion density.” The difference between the first and the second pair of statements is clearly 
seen: the first involves the knowledge of the actor and derives from it. The second does 
not involve the knowledge of the actor, but supposedly some impersonal (suprasocial) 
knowledge, in actual fact the knowledge of the observer. The activities of the actor are 
derived from reasons which do not exist for him. It would almost amount to a truism to 
say that, in most anthropological work, the first type of statement is considered a very 
low level explanation, if at all, and only the second type of statement is considered to be 
really significant. (Exceptions are found, especially in the fields of cognitive anthropology 
and ethnoscience.)
I have argued that, in considering only the second type of statement as really explana-
tory, we are denying the people’s reasons the existential status we ascribe to their activities: 
the activities are “real”, but the reasons are “only for them” or imaginary, and so their fac-
ticity is denied. In doing this, we are committing an ontological sin. At the same time, in 
trying to explain activities by reasons which did not enter into their shaping (and it would 
be difficult to deny that activities are consciously derived from reasons), we are perpetrat-
ing an epistemological absurdity.
One of the main grounds anthropologists have for trying to formulate the second 
type of reason is the assumption of our “rational” conception of reason and the natives’ 20
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“irrational” one. This, of course, leads to the question of what is rational and what are the 
criteria of rationality, a question which is being widely discussed, mostly, if not exclusively, 
by philosophers. The problem is rather succinctly stated by Lukes:
In what follows I shall discuss a philosophical problem arising out of the practice of anthro-
pologists and sociologists which may be stated (…) as follows: when I come across a set of beliefs 
which appear prima facie irrational, what should be my attitude towards them? Should I adopt 
a critical attitude, taking it as a fact about the beliefs that they are irrational, and seek to explain 
how they came to be held, how they manage to survive unprofaned by rational criticism, what 
their consequences are, etc.? Or should I treat such beliefs charitably: should I begin from the 
assumption that what appears to me to be irrational may be interpreted as rational when fully 
understood in its context? More briefly, the problem comes down to whether or not there are 
alternative standards of racionality. [Lukes 1974: 194]
I can see in this quotation two serious problems which bear on my argument in this 
section. The first is a methodological one: how can I possibly “seek to explain” an irra-
tional belief as irrational? The only possibility would be to say that people holding it are 
intrinsically irrational, for example, savages, pagans, or members of some other immutable 
category. This, however, would be just about everything I could say about it, and them, by 
way of explanation. Moreover, it would immediately be invalidated by showing that these 
same people also have rational beliefs or activities. To call a belief irrational means to close 
the door to any possible explanation. It can be understood and explained only by showing 
how it can rationally be held, that is, why and how it is rational.
The second problem, which seems to me to be even more important because it is pos-
sibly here that anthropology and philosophy part company, is: why am I so automatically 
expected to adopt an attitude, critical or charitable, toward the belief in question, or indeed 
toward any phenomenon contained in the social reality? I can legitimately inquire into the 
existence or non-existence of the belief, by asking if verbal assertions or ensuing behaviour 
show that people hold this particular belief. I can also inquire into the meaning and sig-
nificance of their holding it; into the ways they manipulate it or are manipulated by it – or 
more exactly, are manipulated by their, and others’, holding it. There are other fields of 
inquiry as well, which I will try to generalize later on. There is, however, nothing legitimate 
in my inquiry into the rational or irrational character of the things I am studying: firstly, 
because nothing useful can be gained “explanation-wise” by this distinction, and secondly, 
because by doing so I am making a gratuitous comment on the nature and, in the last 
instance, existence of the very things I am studying, thus adding to the reality something 
which did not exist before; that is, I am changing it.
I am afraid that the methodological implications I have been discussing in this section 
are so far only negative. They derive from specific, stated or unstated assumptions about 
the nature of the reality we are studying, and equally specific assumptions about what are 
“real” explanations of it, as distinct from satisfactory contingent explanations. My argu-
ment is practically identical with Welsh’s:
Positive sociology’s attempt to use the natural science paradigm necessarily involves, then, 
assuming that social phenomena possess the same characteristics as natural phenomena. It is 
incumbent, therefore, on positivistic sociology to demonstrate this similarity.What sociological 
phenomenology, on the other hand, argues is that positivistic sociology seriously mistakes the 21
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characteristics of the social world in assuming their comparability to those of the natural world 
and hence that positivistic sociology must necessarily constitute a mistaken enterprise. [Welsh 
1972: 16–17]
Welsh then goes on defining the main differentiae of the natural and social world: basi-
cally, the natural world possesses no intrinsic meaning, while the social world is a world 
constituted by meaning [Welsh 1972: 17]. From this, it follows that: “(…) the social world 
is a subject, not an object world. It does not constitute a reality sui generis divorced from 
the human beings who constitute its membership. Rather, the social world is the existential 
product of human activity and is sustained and changed by such aktivity” [Welsh 1972: 18].
This means that we have to take the declaration that culture, or structure, or society, 
or whatever, is manmade, which so far has existed as a more or less empty credo, as an 
operational methodological assumption on which all our subsequent endeavours should 
really be based. Social reality is a process, continually created, maintained and changed by 
meaningful activities of men. It is not a world composed of facts external to men and, to 
any extent, independent of them. This is its main characteristic, its main ontological fea-
ture, and as such should determine all inquiries and studies. “Social order is the emergent 
product of human activity and the manner of its emergence, therefore, must become the 
central concern of sociological investigation” [Welsh 1972: 20].
Thus, our main concern is not with what institutions exist; what is their specific history, 
independent of how they are historicized by the natives; what are their specific functions, 
in reference to the structuring principles of the natural world; or why and how they exist 
independently of what people take them to be and mean. Our concern is with the fact that 
people live in a known, agreed upon, social world, whatever the actual mechanics of that 
agreement might be, which they continually create, recreate and change by their activities. 
Their socially acquired knowledge makes it possible to manipulate the phenomena of this 
world and at the same time puts certain constraints and limitations on them, which are of 
course basically selfimposed. This double process of manipulating social phenomena and 
being manipulated by one’s knowledge of them shows properties that make it possible for 
us to formulate meaningful generalizable explanations. This I take to be the main task of 
social anthropology.
III.
In the third and concluding section of this paper, I shall on the one hand give some 
attention to various concepts that I have so far taken more or less for granted, and, on 
the other hand, consider some implications of the methodological principles outlined in 
the second section. The title of this volume contains an implicit assumption of the neces-
sary relationship between knowledge and behaviour. It is assumed that behaviour derives 
from the actor’s knowledge (see Jarvie’s argument against the thesis that “belief does not 
explain action”; [Jarvie 1964: 149 ff.]). This is based on the axiomatic conception of human 
behaviour as purposive, as goal oriented. I call it axiomatic, because it cannot be proved or 
refuted without incurring tautologies. However, without accepting it, we could not do any 
systematic work in the social sciences, unless we accept the natural science paradigm. This 
is possible only at the cost of denying the social universe that which makes it a specific 
universe of study, that is, its social character. Activity can be conceived of as purposive or 22
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goal orientated in a meaningful way, only if it is seen as a result of reasoning out that it has 
something to do with the attainment of goals. Such reasoning out is possible only if we 
ascribe to the actor necessary knowledge, not only of the goal and of the effectiveness of the 
action, but in general of phenomena and their relationships in the relevant section of the 
social world.2 I accept here Berger and Luckmann’s definition, in their own terms a very 
simplistic one, of knowledge as “certainty that phenomena are real and that they possess 
specific characteristics” [Berger – Luckmann 1966: 13]. It is, of course, irrelevant what form 
or kind of reality the phenomena have or have been ascribed. Given this definition, the 
difference between knowledge, belief, superstition, etc., becomes meaningless, since all 
of these terms mean taking certain phenomena as existing, in whatever way, and as hav-
ing specific attributes and mutual relationships. Therefore, my use of the term knowledge 
should be understood in this sense. If belief implies anything other than knowledge, then 
Azande do not believe they have witches: they know it in the same sense Christians do not 
believe in the existence of God: they know He exists. The only possible difference I can 
think of between knowledge and other types of certainty about phenomena would be the 
existence or otherwise of tangible proofs, but this is a rather tricky point and, moreover, 
for our purposes, an irrelevant one. If somebody acts on the basis of his certainty that 
such-and-such exists and has such-and-such attributes, it does not greatly matter what is 
the basis of his certainty.
As I have mentioned already, many actions (this term includes non-verbal actions, 
as well as verbal ones, such as assertions and propositions) that we can observe are not, 
in actual fact results of long reasoning processes indulged in by the actors at every single 
opportunity. The actor just knows beforehand, automatically, or because he was “taught” 
so, that such-and-such an action leads to such-and such a goal, or that a certain proposition 
truly describes certain phenomena and their attributes. When a Bathonga junior son goes 
away to save himself from witchcraft threats, he does not inquire whether or not previous 
cases of lineage splitting led to the cancellation of such threats, or why it is that witches 
can function only within the group and not outside of it. He just knows that the safest 
way to deal with witches is to move away. Similarly, we know how to deal with the lack 
of cigarettes without needing to go into deep meditation or problem-solving mental pro-
cess about it. We just go to the nearest shop, hand over the appropriate sum of money, and 
get them. All this knowledge we acquire during our social life. Since these and most other 
human activities are social activities, in the sense that they consist of behaviour towards 
or with regard to other people, they belong to the intersubjective world of shared mean-
ing [cf. Phillipson 1972: 125].3 Social acts are purposive and goal-oriented not only for 
the actor, but also for specific others. Therefore they are normative, taking as a necessary 
minimum of normativity the comprehensibility of the act to others, at some level of social 
grouping. And this is also that level of social grouping which shares with the actor the 
knowledge of a given section of the social world.
2  This cannot be understood literally: I do not mean that any single activity is always preceded by a long reason-
ing process: for many activities we are simply “taught” that they are effective. others have become quite auto-
matic. However, the connection between activity and the attainment of the goal can always be made explicit.
3  I do not intend this as an opening for scholastic discussion of what is and what is not a social act. I do not doubt 
that there are parts of human behaviour which cannot be defined as social acts, these however should interest 
us about as much as data about bees and butterfties.23
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The behaviour then can be explained by the knowledge from which it derives, or, more 
exactly, behaviour can be accounted for as rational, purposive or goal-oriented, only in 
the context of the world known by the actor. This proposition confronts us with a peculiar 
problem that is absent in the natural science paradigm. If what we are explaining is the 
action, and what we are explaining by it is the knowledge of the actors, we should have 
independent means of establishing the existence of that knowledge. If, on the other hand, 
what we are explaining is knowledge, and what we are inferring it from are the activities, 
we should have independent means of establishing the rationality or goal-orientation of 
the activity. Moreover, we can never establish the existence of knowledge or the rationality 
of the action directly, since they both exist “within the people’s heads”. We are constantly 
presented with a “black-box” problem, for which the only solution is to infer the existence 
of the contents from outside indications. Practically, the only evidence we can have that an 
individual has certain knowledge or belief is his verbal assertion to the effect, and/or the fact 
that he behaves accordingly. This seems to be relatively straightforward and unproblematic 
if a particular piece of knowledge can be seen as accounting directly for a non verbal action.
If we see a Bathonga junior son moving out of his lineage, giving as the reason his fear of 
witchcraft, and if we are able to obtain from him an assertion that there are witches and that 
they are dangerous or possibly even that the only safe defence against witches is distance, 
we can consider this particular case closed. By the same token, if we see a Chilean paying to 
a Mapuche Indian a very low price for his sheep, and if we can obtain from him the infor-
mation that Mapuche are lazy drunkards and would spend the money on booze anyway, 
we have again ascertained the Chilean’s reason for action and the knowledge on which 
it is based. In both cases, we account for a particular action by demonstrating that there 
exists not only the knowledge that this action will bring about the desired goal, but also 
the knowledge that in the relevant section of the universe such-and-such phenomena exist 
and have such-and-such relationships. However, we are still moving in a relatively closed 
action-knowledge dyad. The verbal statements in both cases can be reformulated as action 
dispositional propositions of the type: – if there is no stopping of witchcraft activities, I will 
move away; or: – if I buy a sheep from a Mapuche Indian, I will get it cheaper than from 
a Chilean. At best, we are able to show that the relevant knowledge is held by the actors.
However, let us consider statements which are, or can be taken as, assertions of knowl-
edge, such as a Bathonga stating that there are witches, or a Chilean stating that Mapu-
che Indians are lazy drunkards. To account for such statements by showing the existence 
of relevant knowledge would be pointless, since that is exactly their purpose. Clearly, the 
problem here is not to demonstrate that the knowledge exists, but why it exists. This can be 
done by showing its relation to and congruence with other instances of knowledge in the 
relevant section of the social world, by demonstrating that there are social conditions which 
account sufficiently for it being held, and by relating it to a broader context of past and 
present actions. This is the basic procedure which makes it possible for us to move from the 
knowledge-action dyad to an ongoing process of generating activities on the basis of exist-
ing knowledge, of adapting knowledge to existing circumstances, and of manipulating cir-
cumstances by goal-oriented activities. I have tried to show some interpretative implications 
of this procedure in the paper on contemporary Mapuche land tenure later in this volume.
However, the fact that the knowledge exists “within the people’s heads” leaves us still 
with one problem, usually formulated as: “How do I know he believes or knows what 24
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he says he believes or knows?”, or, to fall back on Berger and Luckmann’s definition that 
I mentioned earlier: “How do I know he holds to be true, or existing, what he says he holds 
to be true, or existing?” When a man says, for example, that he believes in God, and fulfils 
all the usual obligations of a true believer, how can I say whether he really believes? In the 
same sense, we can also ask if Bathonga really believe in witches, or if Chileans really hold 
true that Mapuche Indians drink excessively. It is conceivable that a politician can pretend 
he believes in God just to obtain votes, that a Bathonga junior son pretends he believes in 
witches just to have a reason to move out of his lineage, and a Chilean pretends to know 
that Mapuche Indians drink excessively just to legitimize his swindling them. There are, 
I believe, two possible answers to this problem. The first is, that the problem does not, 
in any important sense, arise. The explanation of subsequent actions by relevant knowl-
edge is not invalidated by the fact that a member of the society under observation is able 
to simulate the reasoning. In fact, even such a man has to operate on the basis that his 
behaviour will be accounted for by others as following from the intersubjectively shared 
knowledge, that is, he has to behave so that his activities can be seen by others as derived 
from that knowledge. The second answer is that in important cases there usually are ways 
of recognizing that a man operates on simulated knowledge, for example, by studying his 
behaviour in incompatible situations.
If, for instance, the above-mentioned politician is only pretending to be Christian to 
obtain votes, then presumably he will behave differently when he tries to obtain atheists’ 
votes. If not, then the difference between pretending to believe and believing has no rel-
evance for activities and becomes an academic one. David Riches discusses a somewhat 
similar point in his paper on alcohol abuse in a modern Eskimo settlement in Northern 
Canada in this volume (published previously in Belfast), though not as the central prob-
lem of the paper. Canadian officials who are going to work in an Eskimo settlement are 
informed beforehand that there is a flourishing cooperative functioning there, set up by 
their predecessors. After their arrival they find that this is, in fact, a sort of “report-reality” 
and that the cooperative is functioning, in actual fact, rather badly. Since the existence of 
a flourishing cooperative is, nevertheless, firmly established in all previous reports, they are 
afraid that a realistic description would bring the blame on them, and they therefore prefer 
to maintain the fiction: in other words, they pretend the existence of a certain set of phe-
nomena. Their behaviour is thus based, in one important sphere, on a make  believe reality.
Despite the use of these and other methodological procedures, the study of people’s 
knowledge, reasons, etc., necessarily means that a lot of the anthropologist’s knowledge 
or, more exactly, conjectures are always being brought into it. This is usually considered as 
having been invalidated by Radcliffe-Brown’s famous argument against “if-I-were-a-horse” 
reasoning. Since this polemic classification is often considered as refutation without any 
further proof, I believe it could be useful to look into its real merits. To begin with, let 
us have the whole story. Radcliffe-Brown alludes here to Mark Twain’s story about a boy 
who, seeing that his horse was not in the enclosed pasture, went and found him. When 
asked how, he answered: “Well, I went to the pasture, went down on my knees, ate some 
grass and asked myself: now, if I were a horse, where would I go?” As a joke, it never 
fails – but as an argument? Let us consider an alternative story: a farmer was looking 
for his lost horse around the house; a friend asked him if he had any reason to think the 
horse might be there – the farmer answered: “Well, I really don’t know, but it is quicker 25
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and more comfortable to look for him here.” The moral is that you have to look for your 
horse where he possibly might be, and he will be in a place where it is comfortable for him 
to be, and not necessarily comfortable for you to seek. So, if you do not get on your knees 
and eat some grass, you might never find him. Actually, there are other reasons to make 
more feasible my position that the “if-I-were-a-horse” way of acquiring explanations, is in 
actual fact, the only way to get them, and, at the same time, the way which anthropologists, 
despite their approval of the funny argument, really use. If you ask anybody what is the 
most distinctive feature of the anthropologist’s work, you will most probably be told that 
it is long term fieldwork. Now, most of the anthropologists who went through fieldwork 
take particular pride in how well they got on with the natives, how perfect a “rapport” they 
had. This was possible only because they were able to behave, maybe not as natives, but at 
least in a way comprehensible to them, in a way that fitted into some part of the natives’ 
knowledge. To be able to do that, the anthropologist has to make a series of guesses and 
conjectures about natives’ knowledge and appropriate behaviour: these guesses, or more 
exactly his behaviour resulting from them, are subjected to the same sanctioning processes 
as the behaviour of any member of the group he is studying, though possibly in a different 
way. In other words, if his conjecture is wrong, he gets his fingers rapped. After some time 
he obtains a reasonable working knowledge how to move around, which also means a rea-
sonable knowledge of knowledge and reasons behind actions. Ethnoscientists consider that 
an ideal ethnographic description should be the sum total of what a man must know to be 
able to behave in a culturally appropriate manner [cf. Howard 1963: 409]. After all, I have 
said already that the social world is a world of intersubjectively shared meanings. If they 
are shared, they can be taught and learnt. And the anthropologist is in a better position to 
learn them than anybody else, save the natives. Incidentally, this also demonstrates that 
fieldwork is not only a necessary initiation rite for young anthropologists, as some would 
have it, or a deep spiritual experience during which a layman dies and an anthropologist is 
born. It is the most effective and, I suspect, the only possible way to obtain the descriptions 
and accounts we need for our work.
Now, what I have said so far could be misunderstood as equating an anthropologist’s 
work with the work of a well informed reporter, with the difference that people’s reasons 
and knowledge are brought in more systematically and consistently. That is definitely not 
my position: I am not trying to say that we should do what Lewis, for example, did in his 
Latin American studies [e.g. 1959, 1966], that is, give straightforward accounts of what 
people do and why they say they do it. Such accounts are, of course, necessary starting 
points, since they are the reality we are studying, with the purpose of giving it more “mean-
ing” than that which is directly apparent on the surface. I have argued that what is broadly 
called “positivistic social science” simply substituted another meaning. Phenomenological 
sociology, which declares itself to be opposing it on practically all points, usually presents 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology as its practical accomplishment. Now, Garfinkel’s position, 
simplified almost beyond recognition here, I am afraid, is that people behave in a mean-
ingful way because they provide, as they go, meaningful accounts of what they are doing: 
meaningful in the context of largely taken-for-granted, shared knowledge. What he pro-
poses as the main task of sociological undertaking, in fact as the only legitimate task, is to 
make explicit this taken-for-granted knowledge and the methods people use to make their 
accounts, and therefore their actions, comprehensible and meaningful:26
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Their (i.e. ethnomethodological) study is directed to the tasks of learning how members’ 
actual, ordinary activities consist of methods to make practical actions, practical circumstanc-
es, commonsense knowledge of social structure and practical sociological reasoning analysable; 
and of discovering the formal properties of commonplace, practical commonsense actions, ‘from 
within’ actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of those settings. The formal properties obtain 
their guarantees from no other source and in no other way. [Garfinkel 1967: vii–viii]
However, what has been done by way of research (or, more exactly, experimentation) 
in ethnomethodology so far, tends simply to show the existence of this taken-for-granted 
knowledge, mostly by the expedient of forcing people into situations where it does not 
apply and where they are necessarily confused. Firstly, I do not believe that this makes the 
taken-for-granted world more than commonsensically apparent; after all, many writers use 
the device of letting their actors behave at odds with situational circumstances. Since no 
accounting for the taken-for-granted knowledge is being done or even sought, the ethno-
methodologists tend to move in closed “knowledge-action” dyads. That does not appear to 
me as the only possible or even the most useful method of handling the problem. Secondly, 
it seems that the mutual legitimization of actions and accounts is taken as the only purpose 
of social behaviour, goals are, I suppose, seen as private or individual. Only the ways of 
reaching them are to be systematized and legitimized. I would argue that actions are made 
meaningful or rational when they can be considered, by specific others, as accomplishing, 
on the basis of shared knowledge, commonly approved goals. Often a commonsense clas-
sification of behaviour as irrational does, in actual fact, mean not that the action as such is 
irrational, but that the goal to be reached by it is so.
Instead of a final summit up of the arguments presented in this paper, I would like to 
point out a few ways in which not only activities and “action-dispositional” knowledge, 
but also taken-for  granted knowledge can be explained or accounted for in a more mean-
ingful manner and the principles of its organization exhibited. When anthropologists are 
accounting for actions by norms, they are making the system of actions and system of 
norms practically coextensive (Barth, in a different context, says: “(…) one form, set of 
regular patterns of behaviours, is translated into another, virtually congruent from, made 
up of moral injunctions (…)”; [Barth 1966: 2]). The proportion of one norm to one activ-
ity or one set of activities is sought, I would argue, that this is impossible. We can take 
the example of postmarital residence of the patrilocal Berti society in Western Sudan, 
where, regardless of the norm, 22.9% of marriages are matrilocal and neolocal [Holy 1974: 
112, 115]. Anthropologists traditionally assume that, in such cases patrilocal residence 
is explained by the norm and what is problematic are only the non-patrilocal marriages, 
which are usually explained by introducing contingent factors. This is clearly erroneous. 
If the norm of patrilocality can explain or account for actual marriages, then all marriages 
should be patrilocal. If, on the other hand, there exist contingent factors, these should be 
taken as explanatory tools not only for nonconforming marriages but also for conforming 
ones. In other words, all residence should be accounted for by the same principles: their 
relative strength or weakness, or presence or absence, must be taken into account. Any 
action, even the norm conforming one, would thus appear as a result of the conjunction 
of many and various factors, norms, etc., in short, as a result of the decision of the actor. 
This decision is taken on the basis of his (and others) taken-for granted, shared knowledge. 
However, neither the action itself nor its account by the actor or others can bring this 27
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knowledge, or even the situationally relevant part of it, systematically into evidence. The 
very “taken-for-grantedness” makes it impossible for them. They are usually able to state 
an abstract model of the action (“this is how we do this”), and an account of an actual case 
based on contingent principles, but not the relation between the two. A Mapuche Indian, 
when he speaks about crop-sharing, defines it as a strictly economic agreement where 
both partners are chosen on economic grounds only, one has land, the other seeds, and so 
on. However, when accounting for a particular pair of partners, he will state, as the reason 
for their working together, that they are first cousins. Similarly, Cyrenaica Bedouin state 
that in blood-feud they kill any member of the tertiary section of the guilty man. If they 
had to explain why they did not kill this particular member, they would say “(…) he is 
my brother-in-law” [cf. Peters 1967]. In such cases, the contingency of the second expla-
nation is not seen as contradicting the model, because they do not belong to the same 
“norm-game”. The anthropologist can, by combining these isolated, schematic and broken 
accounts and actions, make explicit and systematic the whole or a significant part of that 
taken-for-granted world, and thus show how what is showing only partly and incidentally, 
works. On the basis of this, he can further show what are the general organizing principles 
of the people’s knowledge and how they make possible the application of knowledge to 
behaviour. However, he can only show them; he cannot, legitimately, supply organizing 
principles: his task is, at best, to make them coherent and comprehensible.
There is another dimension of the taken-for-granted knowledge which makes it possi-
ble for the anthropologist to bring out its systematic qualities. This is its unequal distribu-
tion within the society. It was, and to a large extent still is, assumed that the “knowledge 
of a society” is formed by the sum total of the knowledge of its members, and the norms 
are formulated on the basis of this total knowledge. This is what makes it possible to speak 
about non conforming, or even deviating, behaviour as an objectively valid category. How-
ever, it would seem obvious that there can be no adding up of knowledge. I can live in 
a society which sent a manned rocket to the moon, but the relevant knowledge involved in 
this, or any significant part of it, does not form a part of my known world any more than of 
the known world of a member of any society that did not do it. The society of which I am 
a member may have a long and varied history, but only a very small portion of that history, 
a few selected episodes, belongs to my meaningful world. By the same token, there is no 
reason to suppose that complicated and abstract genealogical models belong to the com-
mon knowledge of all members of a given tribe. In other words, every member of a society 
has his field of knowledge, his taken-for-granted reality, which overlaps with those of other 
members, some of them almost completely, some of them to a variable extent, and some 
of them minimally. A member of the society can, at best, only envisage the existence of 
this differentiation. The anthropologist should be able, by continuous systematization 
of his observations, inferences, accounts, etc., to explain their existence and mutual rela-
tions, more so since he is not necessarily bound to any one of these fields.
The methodological position I have been trying to outline in this paper can be summed 
up very briefly as follows: an individual’s behaviour is seen as the result of a series of 
decisions taken on the basis of his taken-for-granted knowledge about the universe; the 
knowledge is shared by specific others. That is the social reality we are trying to explain. 
He is able to account for his behaviour and state his knowledge in contingent, episodic and 
anecdotal ways, because of its “taken-for-grantedness”. However, a detailed study permits 28
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us to present both his actions and his knowledge in a systematic way, together with the 
principles by which he organizes them. The fact of action being taken as result of a series 
of decisions means that the individual is not just a “norm-fulfilling unit”; he is, within lim-
its given by his knowledge, manipulating his social world. Again, a detailed study should 
make explicit the mechanics of this manipulation. And finally, his knowledge is not some-
thing which is given or intrinsic to him: the anthropologist has also a legitimate problem 
in explaining why this particular social reality came into being, in terms of the broader 
social conditions to which it is related.
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